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A Quantum Leap Backwards:
The Ohio Supreme Court Constricts the Definition of
"Arbitration" in Schaefer v. Allstate Insurance Company
I. INTRODUCTION
When the Ohio General Assembly created the Ohio Commission
on Dispute Resolution and Conflict Management in 1990,1 one
commentator declared that "Ohio has taken a quantum leap in promoting
alternative forms of dispute resolution with a new law that is helping clear
clogged court dockets and encouraging citizens to resolve problems among
themselves."2 This statement recognized Ohio's position as a leader in
developing a public policy that plays an integral part in furthering the
success of many forms of alternative dispute resolution. However, in
Schaefer v. Allstate Insurance Co.,' a plurality of the Ohio Supreme
Court redefined the term "arbitration" in such a limited way that the
opinion will undoubtedly have a chilling effect on the implementation of
effective methods of alternative dispute resolution in Ohio.
In Schafer v. Allstate Insurance Co.,' the Ohio Supreme Court
interpreted a single arbitration clause in a motorist insurance policy
regarding accidents with uninsured motorists that required arbitration of all
disputes between the insurance company and the policy holder. The
controversial and disputed aspect of the clause required that any arbitration
awards below a certain monetary amount would be binding upon both
parties, although awards above that amount would not be binding upon
either party.' After an arbitration between the Schaefers, who held the
policy, and Allstate Insurance Company (Allstate) resulted in an award
below the specified amount, the Schaefers attempted to void the agreement
by arguing that the clause was unconscionable.' Although the trial court
was unimpressed by this argument,' the Ohio Court of Appeals
invalidated the award on unconscionability groundsP and certified two
1. OHiO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 179.01-179.04(Baldwin 1993).
2. Lynne Harbert & Daniel Pollack, Leading the Way in Dispute Resolution: The Ohio
Model, 45 ARB. J., 56, 56 (June 1990).
3. 590 N.E.2d 1242 (Ohio 1992).
4. Id.
5. Id. at 1244.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Schaefer v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 90AP-178, 1991 Ohio App. LEXIS 694 (Ohio Ct.
App. Feb. 12, 1991).
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issues for review to the Ohio Supreme Court.'
Rather than examining the case upon the unconscionability
grounds, a three-member plurality of the seven-member Ohio Supreme
Court delivered an exceedingly narrow opinion that disclaimed the
existence of "nonbinding arbitration" as a legitimate form of alternative
dispute resolution in any matter. The plurality argued that the policy of
Ohio, which supports binding resolution of disputes, weighed heavily
against the existence of nonbinding arbitration, and thus proclaimed that
the arbitration clause as written was unenforceable in its entirety. '
Three justices concurred in this result, noting in a separate opinion that the
plurality's analysis would virtually eliminate nonbinding arbitration as a
useful form of alternative dispute resolution within Ohio.u
The decision by the Ohio Supreme Court in Schaefer is
destructive to alternative dispute resolution in several ways. First, the
plurality's policy proclamation against nonbinding arbitration is both
unprecedented and unwarranted. ' Second, it serves to cripple the use of
nonbinding arbitration in Ohio for the efficient resolution of disputes.'s
Finally, it fails to address the contractual questions posed by such
arbitration clauses as the one at issue in Schaefer, which have attracted
considerable attention and conflicting opinions by several courts in various
jurisdictions.14
9. Schaefer v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 90AP-178, 1991 Ohio App. LEXIS 2064 (Ohio
Ct. App. Apr. 30, 1991).
10. Schaefer, 590 N.E.2d at 1242 (Ohio 1992).
11. Id. at 1250 (Wright, J., concurring in judgment only).
12. Id. at 1252-53 (Wright, J., concurring in judgment only). Justice Wright warns
that, "[t]he zeal of the plurality to 'make new law' is dangerous. Each time this court
chooses to ignore the questions certified by the courts of appeals and decides cases based
upon issues neither raised by the parties nor considered by the courts below, we tread upon
jurisdictional quicksand, and the more we thrash, the deeper we sink." Id.
13. Id. at 1250. The concurrence stated that "the narrow construction of the term
'arbitration' advocated by the plurality adds nothing to the development of the law. Indeed,
it detracts from a widely accepted construction of that term.* Id.
14. Id. at 1253; see also infra notes 75-77. Arbitration provisions similar to the one
employed in Schaefer have been interpreted by courts in several different states, concerning
provisions from several different insurance companies. It is unlikely that this is a mere
coincidence, for insurance companies have generally exhibited a desire to avoid the increased
liability imposed by each state's uninsured motorist liability laws. See, e.g., ALAN I.
WIDISS, UNINSURED AND UNDERINSURED MOTORiSr INSURANCE ch. 6 (2d ed. 1992);
Theodore Postel, Underinsurance Coverage - Nonbinding Arbitration, CM. DAILY L.
BuuEIN, July 5, 1989, at 1.
In fact, insurance companies have been creative in their endeavors to avoid this
increased liability. One successful tactic employed by insurance companies is including
antistacking provisions within their insurance policies, which limit liability to the maximum
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In attempting to deal with these issues, the first part of this Note
will discuss Schaefer v. Allstate Insurance Co., analyzing its case history,
lower court decisions, and ultimately both the plurality and concurring
opinions of the Ohio Supreme Court. The second part of this Note will
analyze various cases that have interpreted uninsured motorist arbitration
clauses such as the one at issue in Schaefer. Finally, this Note will
discuss both statutory and case law, supporting the use of nonbinding
arbitration in Ohio and other jurisdictions.
H. SCHAEFER v ALST47E INSURANCE COMPANY
A. Insurance Policy and Arbitration
On November 8, 1985, Jeanette and David Schaefer were injured
in an accident caused by the negligence of an uninsured motorist.' The
Schaefers' insurance coverage with Allstate Insurance Company provided
amount under any one of several policies applicable to a single accident. See, e.g., ALLAN
D. WINDT, INSURANCE CLAIMs AND DIspUTEs: REPRESENTATION OF INSURANCE
CoMPANIs AND INSUREDS § 6.1 (2d ed. 1988). Although the Ohio Supreme Court has long
validated such a technique, most recently in Hower v. Motorists Mutual Insurance Co., 605
N.E.2d 15 (Ohio 1992), it has now dramatically reversed its position on this issue. See
Savol v. Grange Mutual Insurance Co., 620 N.E.2d 809 (Ohio 1993) (overruling Hower v.
Motorists Mutual Insurance Co., 605 N.E.2d 15 (Ohio 1992); State Farm Auto Insurance Co.
v. Rose, 575 N.E.2d 459 (Ohio 1991); Burris v. Grange Mutual Companies, 545 N.E.2d 83
(Ohio 1989), and Hill v. Allstate Insurance Co., 553 N.E.2d 658 (Ohio 1988)). For further
detail regarding the implementation and validity of such provisions, see also Janet Boeth
Jones, Annotation, Combining or 'Stacking' Uninsured Motorist Coverages Provided in
Policies Issued by Different Insurers to Different Insureds, 28 A.L.R. 4th 362 (1984); Janet
Boeth Jones, Annotation, Combining or 'Stacking" Uninsured Motorist Coverages Provided
In Separate Policies Issued by Same Insurers to Same Insureds, 25 A.L.R. 4th 6 (1983);
Janet Boeth Jones, Annotation, Combining or "Stacking' Uninsured Motorist Coverages
Provided in Fleet Policy, 25 A.L.R. 4th 896 (1983); Janet Boeth Jones, Annotation,
Combining or 'Stacking' Uninsured Motorist Coverages Provided in Single Policy Applicable
to Different Vehicles of Individual Insured, 23 A.L.R. 4th 12 (1983); Janet Boeth Jones,
Annotation, Combining or 'Stacking' Uninsured Motorist Coverages Provided in Separate
Policies Issued by Same Insurer to Different Insureds, 23 A.L.R. 4th 108 (1983); and Janet
Boeth Jones, Annotation, Combining or 'Stacking' Uninsured Motorist Coverages Provided
In Policies Issues by Different Insurers to Same Insured, 21 A.L.R. 4th 211 (1983).
Likewise, the reasons behind the widespread implementation of similar arbitration
provisions in uninsured motorist policies is highly suspect. One author has suggested that
"the purpose is apparently not so much to provide a quick and inexpensive forum for the
settlement of disputes, but to protect the insurer against multiple lawsuits in which its interest
may be adversely affected without being given adequate representation." ROWLAND H.
LONo, 3 THE LAW OF LABnu.rr' INSURANCE § 24.52 (1992).
15. Schaefer, 590 N.E.2d at 1243.
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the Schaefers with uninsured motorist insurance limits of $300,000 per
accident and $100,000 per person." In addition, the insurance contract
made provisions for arbitration in the case of a dispute over the liability of
the insurance carrier. The pertinent clause of the policy originally issued
to the Schaefers stated:
If any person making claim hereunder and Allstate do
not agree that such person is legally entitled to recover damages
from the owner or operator of an uninsured automobile because
of bodily injury to the insured, or do not agree as to the
amount of payment which may be owing under this coverage,
then, upon written demand of either, the matter or matters upon
which such person and Allstate do not agree shall be settled by
arbitration in accordance with the rules of the American
Arbitration Association, and judgment upon the award rendered
by the arbitrators may be entered in any court having
jurisdiction thereof. Such person and Allstate each agree to
consider itself bound and to be bound by any award made by
the arbitrators pursuant to this coverage
This clause clearly required that all disputes be settled through
binding arbitration. However, the original policy was unilaterally
amended with an endorsement by Allstate at some point between the
issuance of the policy and the November 1985 accident."5 Although both
parties agreed that this endorsement served only to amend the original
clause (and thus the parties were still required to resolve all disputes
through arbitration), the Ohio Supreme Court apparently disagreed and
determined that the endorsement served to entirely replace and nullify the
original clause."
Despite the fact that both parties offered slightly different versions
of the endorsement,' the pertinent portion of the endorsement stated:
Regardless of the method of arbitration, any award
16. Id.
17. Id. at 1247.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 1248.
20. The Schaefers' version of the endorsement required that arbitration be used to
resolve all disputes concerning the policy, whereas Allstate's version only made arbitration a
voluntary method. Regardless, both parties evidently interpreted the different language in
their respective versions to require arbitration, rendering any apparent point of contention
moot. Schaefer, 590 N.E.2d at 1248.
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not exceeding the limits of the Financial Responsibility Law of
Ohio will be binding and may be entered as a judgment in a
proper court.
Regardless of the method of arbitration, when any
arbitration award exceeds the Financial Responsibility limits of
the State of Ohio, either party has a right to trial on all issues
in a court of competent jurisdiction .... I
Thus, the endorsement intended to create an arbitration procedure from
which the resulting award would only be binding if it were not greater
than the limits of Ohio's Financial Liability Law for uninsured
motorists.?
The dispute proceeded to arbitration on March 30, 1989, and the
arbitrators found:
(1) That the claimants have failed to sustain their burden by a
procedure [sic]' of the evidence that the accident of
November 8, 1985 caused a permanent or disabling injury to
Jeanette Schaefer or that it aggravated the injury resulting from
her fall in 1984 and the condition from which she now
suffers.2
As a result, the arbitration panel awarded Jeanette Schaefer only $1,500 in
damages and awarded David Schaefer only $500 in damages, which were
amounts well below the limits set by Ohio's Financial Responsibility
Law.' Although the terms of the endorsement clearly claimed that such
an award was binding upon all parties, the Schaefers filed a motion to
vacate the award. The motion to vacate was subsequently overruled by
the trial court, which affirmed the arbitration panel's award.' The
Schaefers appealed to the Ohio Court of Appeals for the Tenth District,
asserting two assignments of error that included the argument that the
21. Id. at 1247.
22. Ohio's Financial Responsibility Law requires coverage of at least $12,500 per
person and $25,000 per accident. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4509.01(K) (Baldwin 1992).
23. The Ohio Court of Appeals decision determined that 'procedure" was a
typographical error for *preponderance.' Schaefer v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 90AP-178, 1991
Ohio App. LEXIS 694, at *12 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 12, 1991).
24. Id. at *2-3 (textual correction in original).
25. See OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4509.01(K) (Baldwin 1992).
26. Schaefer, 590 N.E.2d at 1244.
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clause making the award binding was unconscionable."
B. Ohio Tenth District Court of Appeals
The Tenth District of the Ohio Court of Appeals, in an opinion by
Judge Bowman, agreed with the Schaefers' contention that the policy was
unconscionable.' As a result, the Court of Appeals remanded the case
with the intent that all awards under the policy be appealable by a trial de
novo.2 The court premised its finding of unconscionability on Trupp v.
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,' which also dealt with an
appeal brought by an insured individual who wished to invalidate an
uninsured motorist provision with an arbitration clause similar to the one
at issue in Schaefer. In Trupp, the Ohio Court of Appeals for the Second
District ruled that the arbitration provision was fundamentally unfair
because it allowed the insurance company to appeal an unfavorable award
but did not allow the policy holder the same luxury.' However, unlike
the Tenth District's conclusion that the invalidity of the arbitration
provision rendered all awards appealable, the Second District concluded
that the invalid provision should be remedied to make all awards binding.
In its analysis, the Second District also relied upon the concurring opinion
of Justice Sweeney in the Ohio Supreme Court's Nationwide Mutual
27. The Schaefers' two assignments of error were:
FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ENFORCING THE ARBITRATION
AWARD BECAUSE THE CONTRACT PROVISION WHICH
MAKES THAT AWARD BINDING IS UNCONSCIONABLE AND
DENIES APPELLANTS EQUAL CONTRACTUAL RIGHTS AS THE
APPELLEE.
SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS' MOTION TO VACATE THE
ARBITRATORS' AWARD PURSUANT TO THE PROVISION IN
REVISED CODE § 2711.10.
Schaefer, No. 90AP-178, 1991 Ohio App. LEXIS 694, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 12, 1991).
28. Id. at *10.
29. Id.
30. 575 N.E.2d 847 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989).
31. Id. at 850.
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Insurance Co. v. Marsh.' In that case, which contained an arbitration
provision analogous to those at issue in Schaefer and Trupp, Justice
Sweeney argued that the plurality should not have failed to address the
issue of the provision's validity.n In fact, Justice Sweeney believed that
the provision determined the case because it was against public policy and
thus unconscionable. '
The Tenth District also noted that other Ohio Courts of Appeals
had dealt with similar arbitration provisions with differing results. For
example, in Motorists Mutual Insurance Co. v. Said,35 the Ohio Court of
Appeals for the Eighth District concluded that because a similar provision
affected both parties equally, the provision was not unconscionable.'
Following the Eighth District's reasoning in Said, the Ohio Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh District likewise concluded in Roen v. State
Farm Mutual Insurance Co. 37 that a similar provision was not
unconscionable.'
Despite the apparent conflict among the courts of appeals, the
Tenth District followed the rationale of Roen and Justice Sweeney's
concurrence in Marsh in determining that the arbitration policy was "so
fundamentally unfair as to be unconscionable." 3 The Tenth District
came to this conclusion despite a recognition that public policy would
indicate a favoritism for binding arbitrations, stating "[a]lthough public
policy may favor binding arbitration when the parties expressly agree,
public policy does not favor imposing arbitration upon parties who have
not agreed. "* Thus, unlike the Second District, the Tenth District
refused to remedy the policy by considering all arbitration awards binding,
regardless of amount and instead concluding that both parties should be
allowed a trial de novo under any award:
If we were to refuse to recognize only the non-binding portion
of the arbitration clause, making all awards binding, then we
would be effectively stripping away the parties' right to access
the courts guaranteed by Section 16, Article I, of the Ohio
32. 472 N.E.2d 1061 (Ohio 1984) (Sweeney, J., concurring).
33. Id. at 1063.
34. Id.
35. Slip Opinion, No. 52700 (Ohio Ct. App. Cuyahoga Sept. 3, 1987).
36. Id. at 3.
37. 1989 Ohio App. LEXIS 399 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 10, 1989).
38. Id. at *7-8.
39. Schaefer, No. 90AP-178, 1991 Ohio App. LEXIS 694, at *8.
40. Id. at "9.
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Constitution. Furthermore, R.C. 2711.01 and 2711.03 provide
for enforcement of arbitration only if required by a written
contract between the parties and here there is no agreement or
contract for binding arbitration of an award in excess of the
statutory amount.
C. Ohio Supreme Court
Noting that considerable conflict existed among the lower courts
of Ohio, the Tenth District certified two specific issues for Ohio Supreme
Court review on April 30, 1991.' These issues were:
(1) whether a binding arbitration clause in an automobile
insurance policy providing that an award not exceeding the
41. Id.
Omo CONST. art. I, § 16 states:
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury
done him in his land, goods, person, or reputation, shall have remedy
by due course of law, and shall have justice administered without denial
or delay. Suits may be brought against the state, in such courts and in
such manner, as may be provided by law.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2711.01 (Baldwin 1992) states, in part:
(A) A provision in any written contract . . . to settle by
arbitration a controversy that subsequently arises out of the contract, or
out of the refusal to perform the whole or any part of the contract, or
any agreement in writing between two or more persons to submit to
arbitration any controversy existing between them at the time of the
agreement to submit, or arising after the agreement to submit, from a
relationship then existing between them or that they simultaneously
create, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, except upon
grounds that exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.
OMO REV. CODE ANN. § 2711.03 (Baldwin 1992) states, in part:
The party aggrieved by the alleged failure of another to
perform under a written agreement for arbitration may petition any
court of common pleas having jurisdiction of the party so failing to
perform for an order directing that such arbitration proceed in the
manner provided for in such agreement....
42. Schaefer v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 90AP-178, 1991 Ohio App. LEXIS 2064 (Ohio
Ct. App. Apr. 30, 1991).
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limits of the Financial Responsibility Law of Ohio will not be
subject to a trial de novo, is so fundamentally unfair as to be
unconscionable; and
(2) what effect a finding of unonscionability will have upon
enforcement of an award made under a binding arbitration
clause. 0
The Ohio Supreme Court rendered its decision in a plurality
opinion by Justice Douglas, in which Justices Sweeney and Resnick
concurred.' Rather than confronting the legal issues that the Tenth
District certified for review, the plurality, sua sponte, focused solely on
the definition of the term "arbitration." The plurality argued that the real
problem lay in the imprecise use of the term "arbitration." 5 The court
simplistically explained this theory claiming that the term "binding
arbitration" is a redundancy and that "nonbinding arbitration" is a
contradiction in terms." Thus, if an agreement requires the use of
"arbitration" for the resolution of disputes, the plurality would only allow
review of the award pursuant to the procedures set forth in R.C.
2711.13,.1 and only upon the grounds set out in R.C. 2711.10 and
43. Id. at *3-4.
44. Schaefer v. Allstate Ins. Co., 590 N.E.2d 1242 (Ohio 1992).
45. rd. at 1245.
46. Id.
47. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2711.13 (Baldwin 1992), which states, in part:
After an award in an arbitration proceeding is made, any party to the
arbitration may file a motion in the court of common pleas for an order
vacating, modifying, or correcting the award as prescribed in sections
2711.10 and 2711.11 of the Revised Code ....
48. OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 2711.10 (Baldwin 1992), which states, in part:
In any of the following cases, the court of common pleas
shall make an order vacating the award upon the application of any
party to the arbitration if:
(A) The award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue
means.
(B) There was evident partiality or corruption on the part of
the arbitrators, or any of them.
(C) The arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to
postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to
hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other
misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced.
(D) The arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly
executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject
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R.C. 2711.11. 49 Under this analysis, the express mutual intent of the
parties to make arbitration awards appealable is irrelevant: "This is so
even if a qualification on the finality of the award is mutually agreed to, by
the parties. When parties agree to make an award rendered in an
'arbitration' procedure appealable, the proceeding is no longer an
arbitration.,'se
The plurality's foundation for this conclusion was primarily a
professed dedication to the strong public policy of Ohio favoring
arbitration.' The plurality noted that arbitration is favored by Ohio
courts because it leads to expeditious resolution of disputes, providing
parties with an efficient and inexpensive method of dispute resolution that
has the additional benefit of reducing the load on court dockets. '
Construing such terms as "determining"' and "resolution"'
matter submitted was not made ....
49. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2711.11 (Baldwin 1992), which states:
In any of the following cases, the court of common pleas in
the county wherein an award was made in an arbitration proceeding
shall make an order modifying or correcting the award upon the
application of any party th the arbitration if:
(A) There was an evident material miscalculation of figures
or an evident material mistake in the description of any person, thing,
or property referred to in the award;
(B) The arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not
submitted to them, unless it is a matter not affecting the merits of the
decision upon the matters submitted;
(C) The award is imperfect in matter of form not affecting
the merits of the controversy.
The order shall modify and correct the award, so as to effect
the intent thereof and promote justice between the parties.
50. Schaefer, 590 N.E.2d at 1245.
51. Id. (citing Brennan v. Brennan, 128 N.E.2d 89 (Ohio 1955) (para. 1 of syllabus);
Mahoning County Bd. of Mental Retardation v. Mahoning County TMR Educ. Ass'n., 488
N.E.2d 872 (Ohio 1986); Findlay City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Findlay Educ. Ass'n.,
551 N.E.2d 186 (Ohio 1990)).
52. Schaefer, 596 N.E.2d at 1245.
53. Id. (citing Ohio Council 8, AFSCME v. Ohio Dept. of Mental Health, 459 N.E.2d
220, 222 (Ohio 1984), quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (3rd
ed. 1966) ("arbitration . . . [is the] hearing and determining of a case between parties in
controversy.... .") (emphasis added by quoting opinion)).
54. Id. (quoting Mahoning County Bd. of Mental Retardation v. Mahoning County
TMR Educ. Ass'n., 488 N.E.2d 872, 875 (Ohio 1986) ("Arbitration occurs when disputing
parties contractually agree to resolve their conflict by submitting it to a neutral third party for
resolution.") (emphasis added by quoting opinion)).
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from prior decisions, the plurality then proceeded to define the word
"arbitration" to refer to only binding resolutions. Indeed, the plurality
went so far as to quote Black's Law Dictionary as an authority on the
word's singular meaning u Moreover, the plurality quoted extensively
from a fifty year old treatise in support of its proposition."' In addition,
the plurality offered the Ohio General Assembly's legislation concerning
arbitration this same non-contextual analysis, arguing that the Ohio
Revised Code only recognizes arbitration as necessarily binding.s
As a result of this analysis, the plurality ultimately found that
"whatever alternative-dispute-resolution procedure is provided for [in the
clause at issue], that procedure is not arbitration.' Also, the plurality
was concerned that the provision ultimately "subjects the parties to
multiple proceedings in a variety of forums, increases costs, extends the
time consumed in ultimately resolving a dispute, and eviscerates any
advantage of unburdening crowded court dockets.""' As a result, "the
provision completely frustrates the purposes of 'arbitration' and every
public policy reason favoring the arbitration system of dispute
resolution."" Ultimately, the court affirmed the appellate court's
decision finding the arbitration provision unenforceable, not because it was
unconscionable, but because it was void as against public policy,
predicated on the plurality's new definition for "arbitration."
55. Id. at 1246 (quoting BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 105 (6th ed. 1990) ("[Arbitration
is] an arrangement for taking and abiding by the judgment of selected persons in some
disputed matter, instead of carrying it to established tribunals of justice ... ") (emphasis
added by quoting opinion)).
56. Schaefer, 590 N.E.2d at 1246 (quoting FRANCES A. KELLOR, ARBITRATION IN
ACTION 4 (1941) ("For it is only in arbitration that arbitration law accords the high privilege
of giving the decision of an arbitrator the same legal effect as a judgment of the court ....
The purpose of arbitration is, therefore, to determine a difference . . . finally and, in so
doing, to exclude a court of law from such determination .... ") (emphasis added by quoting
opinion)). The court also quoted definitions from MARTIN DOMmE, THE LAW AND PRACICE
OF COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION §1.02 (1968), and THOMAs H. OEHMKE, COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION § 2:1 (1987). Of course, this approach is highly vulnerable, for many
contradictory definitions of alternative dispute resolution terms may be extracted from any
number of treatises discussing this ever-evolving field. For example, see A DICTIONARY OF
ARBITRATION AN ITS TERMs 7 (Katharine Seide, ed. 1970), which includes a description of
"advisory arbitration" as "[a]n effort to resolve specific issues in a dispute by an arbitrator
who renders an award which merely recommends possible solutions and is therefore not
binding on the parties."
57. Schaefer, 590 N.E.2d at 1246.
58. Id. at 1248 (emphisis in original).
59. Id.
60. Id.
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I. CRMQUE OF SCHAEFER
A. Concurring Opinion
Although six of the Ohio Supreme Court's seven justices
concurred in finding the arbitration provision in Schaefer unenforceable,
three justices differed in analysis and thus concurred in judgment only. In
his concurrence, Justice Wright noted that the plurality had "sua sponte,
taken this case as an opportunity to pronounce law on an issue neither
briefed by the parties nor discussed by any court below .. . I am
disturbed by the 'law' the plurality gratuitously pronounces in reaching its
decision. "61
Indeed, the concurrence recognized that the plurality had not only
confused Ohio's preexisting policy supporting arbitration by asserting that
"nonbinding arbitration" is oxymoronic and "binding arbitration" is
redundant, but also that it had created an entirely new policy dictating the
technical use of the term arbitration. The concurrence considered the
immediate ramifications of such a policy, noting that "[n]ot only will this
be news to the parties in this case, the trial courts and the courts of
appeals below (not to mention the whole of the Ohio judiciary), it will no
doubt come as surprising to the General Assembly, which has used one or
both of the terms 'binding' and 'nonbinding' to modify arbitration...
The concurrence further argued that "the narrow construction of the
term 'arbitration' advocated by the plurality adds nothing to the
development of the law. Indeed, it detracts from a widely accepted
construction of the term."' According to the concurrence, the word
arbitration merely describes a procedure through which a neutral third
party gives an advisory decision on an issue in dispute."
The concurrence also contested the plurality's obvious disregard
for the intent of the parties: "The degree to which parties agree to be
bound by an arbitrator's decision flows not from the incantation of the
word 'arbitration,' but rather from the parties' intent as expressed through
an arbitration agreement."'
Indeed, the concurrence further asserted that while binding
alternative dispute resolution is perhaps preferable, it is certainly not the
61. Schaefer, 590 N.E.2d at 1250 (Wright, J., concurring in judgment only).
62. Id. (citing OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2711.21 (Baldwin 1992) (allowing the use of
nonbinding arbitration before litigating any medical malpractice claims in Ohio)).
63. Id.
64. Id. (citing BLACK'S LAW DIcIoNARY 105 (6th ed. 1990)).
65. Id. at 1251.
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sole method adopted by the state: "(Tihe promotion of nonbinding
arbitration as one of a panoply of alternative dispute resolution techniques
is presently favored public policy in our state."" The concurrence
acknowledged that an award from a nonbinding arbitration is
unenforceable under R.C. Chapter 2711, but noted that such an award
may nevertheless be enforceable under general contract law if both parties
should subsequently agree to abide by the award thereby waiving any right
to pursue litigation.'
Finally, the concurrence noted that nonbinding arbitration,
although not necessarily dispositive, provides the parties, "with a definitive
view by a neutral third party of the merits of their conflict, after a full
hearing that can include testimony under oath, R.C. 2711.06, and the use
of depositions, R.C. 2711.07.' Therefore, the concurrence concluded
that "the salutary effects of such a procedure far outweigh any perceived
need for finality that the plurality equates with the use of the term
'arbitration.' As such, the concurrence would have found an
agreement to proceed to nonbinding arbitration enforceable so far as it
would require such a proceeding before litigation.
Thus, the concurrence agreed with the plurality that the award
was unenforceable, not because the clause was per se against arbitration
66. Schaefer, 590 N.E.2d at 1251 (citing as support OHIO REV. CODE ANN. Ch. 179
(Baldwin 1992) (establishing the Ohio Commission on Dispute Resolution and Conflict
Management to promote alternative dispute resolution techniques, and listing nonbinding
arbitration as one suggested method)).
67. Id. (citing Ohio Council 8, AFSCME v. Ohio Dept. of Mental Health, 459 N.E.2d
220 (Ohio 1984)).
68. Schaefer, 590 N.E.2d at 1257.
69. Id. OHIO Rnv. CODE ANN. § 2711.06 (Baldwin 1992) states, in part:
The arbitrators . . . may subpoena in writing any person to attend
before any of them as a witness and in a proper case to bring with him
any book, record, document, or paper which it is deemed material as
evidence in the case....
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2711.07 (Baldwin 1992) states:
Upon petition approved by the arbitrators, or by majority of
them, the court of common pleas in the county in which such
arbitrators, or a majority of them, are sitting may direct the taking of
depositions to be used as evidence before the arbitrators, in the same
manner and for the same reasons as provided by law for the taking of
depositions in suits or proceedings pending in such court.
70. Id.
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policy, but because, as found by the Court of Appeals, the arbitration
clause was so unfair as to be unconscionable. This was because the
arbitration clause, while facially equitable, in essence mandated binding
arbitration for the insureds and nonbinding arbitration for the insurance
company, and as such was manifestly unjust. 7
B. Other Courts
As the Court of Appeals for the Tenth District noted in its
opinion, nonbinding arbitration provisions in uninsured motorist's policies
have garnered much attention among the lower courts of Ohio, with
conflicting results.' As discussed earlier, the Second District, in Trupp
v. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co.," held that such a provision
was unenforceable because it was so manifestly unfair as to be
unconscionable.' That court suggested the proper remedy should be to
make all awards binding rather than only those awards below the statutory
financial responsibility requirements. Other courts, such as the Eighth
District and the Eleventh District, have differed by concluding that such a
provision is not unconscionable, and thus have enforced such provisions as
written." However, as the concurring opinion makes clear, the
plurality's opinion in Schaefer did nothing to clear the confusion
surrounding such arbitration agreements.
Indeed, the confusion is not concentrated in Ohio's courts alone,
for courts in other jurisdictions have also wrestled with the legal and
policy issues concerning similar controversial arbitration agreements.'
For example, Connecticut, Minnesota, Rhode Island, Hawaii,
Pennsylvania, New York, and Florida all have cases where similar
nonbinding arbitration provisions were at issue.'
71. Id. at 1252.
72. Schaefer v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 90AP-178, 1991 Ohio App. LEXIS 694 (Ohio
Ct. App. Feb. 12, 1991).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 852.
75. See Motorists Mut. Ins. Co. v. Said, No. 52700 (Ohio Ct. App. Cuyahoga Sept. 3,
1987); Roen v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., No. 1988, 1989 Ohio App. LEXIS 399 (Ohio Ct.
App. Feb. 10, 1989).
76. See, e.g., SUSAN J. MILLER & PHILp LEFEvRE, MILLER'S STANDARD
INSURANCE POLCIES ANNOTATED (1992) (annotating many cases dealing with similar
arbitration provisions).
77. See Mendes v. Auto. Ins. Co. of Hartford, 563 A.2d 695 (Conn. 1989); Field v.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 769 F. Supp. 1135 (D.Haw. 1991); Roe v. Amica Mut. Ins. Co., 533
So.2d 279 (Fla. 1988); Schmidt v. Midwest Family Mut. Ins. Co., 426 N.W.2d 870 (Minn.
1988); Reichel v. Gov't. Employees Ins. Co., 107 A..2d 463 (N.Y. 1985); Hiller v. Allstate
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Of these cases, only two support the Schaefer plurality's theory
that a nonbinding arbitration agreement violates the public policy
supporting the final resolution of disputes. Even so, neither case went
so far as to wholly eliminate the technique of nonbinding arbitration as an
effective tool of alternative dispute resolution. Rather, both courts merely
found that the arbitration provisions at issue (i.e. where only awards above
a predetermined amount are appealable by a trial de novo) were void as
against public policy." This was not because, as in Schaefer, the term
"nonbinding arbitration" was empirically oxymoronic, but rather because
as applied the provisions violated public policyr Thus, both courts
were able to invalidate a similar arbitration provision largely on the same
theory as the Schaefer plurality, but without detracting from the creative
development of new alternative dispute resolution techniques.
IV. SUPPORT FOR NONBINDING ARBrrRATION
Despite the Schaefer plurality's view to the contrary, nonbinding
arbitration is a wholly legitimate, greatly useful, and widely recognized
form of alternative dispute resolution!' Like mediation, nonbinding
arbitration provides conflicting parties with a neutral third-party view of
their conflict. As such, nonbinding arbitration is as highly productive as
mediation in situations where parties do not wish to be bound by a decree,
but do wish to receive an informal and educated assessment of the factual
Ins. Co., 446 A.2d 273 (Pa. 1982); Pepin v. American Univ. Ins. Co., 540 A.2d 21 (R.L
1988).
78. Pepin, 540 A.2d at 23; Schmkk, 426 N.W.2d at 875.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Many sources that have discussed arbitration as an alternative dispute resolution
technique have readily defined arbitration to include both binding and nonbinding formats.
See NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION, PATHS TO JUSTICE: MAJOR PUBLIC
POUCY IssuES OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION 5 (1983) (Report of the Ad Hoc Panel on Dispute
Resolution and Public Policy); see also Robert P. Bigelow, ADR on the Increase, LEaAL
ECON., September 1988, at 58 (resenting statistics collected from Fortune 1000 companies
which show that when selecting a method of alternative dispute resolution, more companies
prefer nonbinding arbitration over binding arbitration); Eldon H. Crowell & Charles Pou, Jr.,
Study, Appealing Government Contract Decisions: Reducing the Cost and Delay of
Procurement Litigation with Alternative Dispute Resolution Techniques, 49 MD. L. REV. 183,
231 (1990); Lawrence Suaskind & Denise Madigan, New Approaches to Resolving Disputes
in the Public Sector, 9 JUST. Sys. J. 179, 183 (1984) (defining "nonbinding arbitration" as
distinct from "binding arbitration').
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issues and legal arguments involved in the disputeU
Although nonbinding arbitration is similar to mediation in that it
results in an advisory, rather than binding decree, nonbinding arbitration
can be even more useful and informative because it allows for more
intricacies and formal legal procedures than does mediation.'
For example, nonbinding arbitration may more easily allow for the use of
formal depositions, subpoenas, and testimony under oath. Also, a
nonbinding arbitration usually will be overseen by a panel of experienced
and knowledgeable experts, trained in the fields at issue in the dispute,
whereas mediation tends to be facilitated by a solo mediator, trained in the
art of conciliation. Finally, nonbinding arbitration usually results in a
final (albeit nonbinding) award, as compared to mediation, which
typically results in a "meeting of minds" or reaching a "happy
medium. "
Clearly, many legislatures, academics, and members of the
judiciary have recognized the benefits of engaging in and encouraging the
82. As such, nonbinding arbitration has received much credit for being a valuable tool
for facilitating quick and inexpensive dispute resolution. See, e.g., Kimbrough v. Holiday
Inn, 478 F. Supp. 566, 571 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (At the very least, nonbinding arbitration "helps
counsel streamline their case and direct their additional discovery in profitable areas.*); see
also Thomas E. Carbonneau, A Consideration of Alternatives to Divorce Litigation, 1986 U.
ILL. L. REV. 1119, 1124 (describing nonbinding arbitration as "an alternative mechanism..
. meant to act as a deterrent to judicial adjudications; its objective is to reduce recourse to
the courts and to free court dockets.").
83. See Craig A. McEwen, Symposium: Pursuing Problem Solving or Predictive
Settlement, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 77, 78-79 (1991). McEwen defines the central
distinction among ADR or settlement processes [as] one between predictive settlement
procedures and problem-solving procedures." (emphasis in original). McEwen places
nonbinding arbitration within the predictive settlement procedure group for it provides the
parties to a dispute "a chance to try out their adversarial presentations and to have some
assessment of the outcome by a 'neutral' third party." This, as opposed to mediation, which
McEwen places within the problem-solving procedure group, for nonbinding arbitration does
not challenge "the traditional model of 'litigation' in which adversarial settlement negotiations
occur in the context of discovery and pretrial motions and in the shadow of a likely
adjudicated outcome." Id. (footnotes omitted).
84. See, e.g., Schaefer, 590 N.E.2d at 1250 (Wright, J., concurring in judgment only);
OHo REV. CODE ANN. § 2711.06 (Baldwin 1992); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2711.07
(Baldwin 1992).
85. See generally Thomas D. Lambros, The Swmnary Jury Trial and Other Alternative
Methods of Dispute Resolution, 103 F.R.D. 461 (1985).
86. Id.; see also Frank E. A. Sander et al., Alternative Dispute Resolution: An ADR
Primer, A.B.A. STANDING COMMrrTEE ON Disp. RESOL. (1987).
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use of nonbinding arbitration. 7 For example, in Ohio, the General
Assembly has used the term "nonbinding arbitration" in several different
circumstances. In one instance, the General Assembly has expressly
encouraged the use of nonbinding arbitration by establishing the Ohio
Commission on Dispute Resolution and Conflict Management.' The
General Assembly established this Commission expressly "to provide,
coordinate, fund, and evaluate dispute resolution and conflict management
education, training, and research programs in this state. . . ."8 The
statute defines "dispute resolution and conflict management programs" to
include any program that provides or encourages nonbinding arbitration."
The Ohio General Assembly also expressly provided for the use of
nonbinding arbitration by adopting a voluntary, nonbinding arbitration
procedure as a possible prerequisite to proceeding with litigation in a
medical malpractice suit.' Thus, in these two instances the Ohio
General Assembly has expressly provided for and endorsed the use of
nonbinding arbitration in various settings. Obviously, this brings into
question the Schaefer plurality's statement that "[a] review of [the Ohio
Revised Code] clearly indicates that arbitration is intended to be an
alternate method of dispute resolution which is final (and must be accorded
finality) in all circumstances except those specifically set forth."'
Provisions for nonbinding arbitration in medical malpractice suits
are commonplace, and have been adopted by several other state
legislatures in addition to the Ohio General Assembly." In fact, several
87. See generally, Francis Flaherty, Superfind and Alternative Dispute Resolution - A
Good Fit, MiCH. LAW. WKLY., Nov. 30, 1992, at 22. The author discusses that the United
States Environmental Protection Agency now plans to implement nonbinding arbitration
techniques in Superfuid cases because nonbinding arbitration "helps the agency to better
fulfill its Superfund mandate - - quick site cleanup." Id.
88. OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 179.01 (Baldwin 1993). The establishment of this
commission has been hailed as "the first government-sponsored commission in the United
States to promote dispute resolution at all levels of society." Lynne Harbert & Daniel
Pollack, Leading the Way in Dispute Resolution: The Ohio Model, 45 ARE. J., June 1990, at
56.
89. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 179.02(A) (Baldwin 1993).
90. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 179.01(8)(1) (Baldwin 1993).
91. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2711.21 (Baldwin 1993).
92. Schaefer, 590 N.E.2d at 1246.
93. See generally Kristine Cordier Karnezis, Annotation, Validity and Construction of
State Statutory Provisions Relating to Limitations on Amount of Recovery in Medical
Malpractice Caim and Submission of Such Claim to Pretrial Panel, 80 A.L.R. 3d 583
(1977) and cases cited therein. The author notes that "such provisions typically provide that
malpractice claims must be submitted to a panel for a review . . . before . . . trial,
apparently in an attempt to encourage settlements." Id. at 589.
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state courts and federal district courts have adopted similar mandatory
nonbinding arbitration proceedings as prerequisites to filing a claim, as a
productive way of diminishing the great many cases filed in those
courts." The United States Congress has also expressly condoned the
use of such nonbinding arbitration programs in sixteen of the nation's
federal district courts.'
Of course, the benefits of advisory, nonbinding alternative dispute
resolution techniques have also not escaped judicial attention. For
example, in addition to the many courts which have adopted nonbinding
arbitration programs, Judge Lambros of the Northern District of Ohio has
pioneered the use of advisory summary jury trials, which are proceedings
substantially similar to nonbinding arbitrations.' In addition, the United
States Supreme Court has recently implemented changes to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure that include implicit support of the use of
nonbinding arbitration as a pretrial effort towards settlement." Similar
94. See PATRICIA A. EBENER & DONNA R. BETANCOURT, COURT-ANNEXED
ARBITRATION: THE NATIONAL PICTURE (1985); see also Bernard J. A'Avella, Jr., How to
Get People to Use ADR, N.J. L.J., Aug. 16, 1993, at 6 (noting that mandatory nonbinding
arbitration solves the problem of convincing parties to initiate settlement discussions by
giving the parties an opportunity to present its case to a fair and impartial third party);
Deborah R. Hensler, What We Know and Don't Know About Court-Administered Arbitration,
69 JUDICATURE 270, 272, table 1 (1986) (presenting a comprehensive list of district and state
courts that have adopted a method of court-administered nonbinding alternative dispute
resolution).
95. See 28 U.S.C. 651 (1993) (granting authority to selected district courts to establish
mandatory pretrial advisory programs); see also John F. Wagner, Jr., Annotation, Validity
and Effect of Local District Court Rules Providing for Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution
Procedures as Pretrial Settlement Mechanisms, 86 A.L.R. FED. 211; Paul L. Friedman,
Speeding Up Justice at the District Court, LEGAL TIMEs, Apr. 19, 1993, at 30 (citing one of
the recommendations of the Civil Justice Reform Act Advisory Group of the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia as adding nonbinding arbitration to a menu of
mandatory alternative dispute resolution procedures).
96. See generally, Thomas D. Lambros, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Alternative
Methods of Dispute Resolution, 103 F.R.D. 461 (1985).
97. See 146 F.R.D. 401 (1993). The new Rule 16 is changed to read, in part: '(6)
Subjects for Consideration at Pretrial Conferences. At any conference under this rule
consideration may be given, and the court may take appropriate action, with respect to ...
(9) settlement and the use of special procedures to assist in resolving the dispute when
authorized by statute or local rule. . . ." 146 F.R.D. at 428-29. The accompanying
Committee Notes to Rule 16 state that, "[p]aragraph (9) is revised to describe more
accurately the various procedures that, in addition to traditional settlement conferences, may
be helpful in settling litigation. Even if a case cannot immediately be settled, the judge and
attorneys can explore possible use of alternative procedures such as . . . nonbinding
arbitration that can lead to consensual resolution of the dispute without a full trial on the
merits." Id. at 604. Under the Rules Enabling Act, the new Rules took effect on Dec. 1,
1993. See Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, NAT'L L. J., June 6, 1993,
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changes have been recently implemented in the Ohio Rules of Civil
Procedure." Academics and leaders in the fields of alternative dispute
resolution and legal reform have also looked to nonbinding arbitration as
an excellent resource and opportunity to effectively resolve disputes
outside of the courtroom." For example, the American Trial Institute
has recommended a model for successful mandatory ADR, with the stated
purpose of "finding and implementing ways to render justice with
reasonable speed, efficiency, humaneness and accuracy,"'* which
includes support for "nonbinding ADR before full discovery and
trial." 11
Finally, the merit of nonbinding arbitration has also not escaped
the notice of the business communityS For example, in Ohio, a
project jointly sponsored by the Ohio Chamber of Commerce and the Ohio
at S1.
98. Rule 16 of the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure now concludes with the following
language: "The court may require that parties, or their representatives or insurers, attend a
conference or otherwise participate in pretrial proceedings, in which case the court shall give
reasonable advance notice to the parties of the conference or proceedings." OHIO ST. B.
ASS'N REP., May 31, 1993, at xlix (1993). The Staff Note to Rule 16 explains: "With a
reference to conferences and other pretrial proceedings, the additional paragraph authorizes
courts, in appropriate cases, to direct parties and counsel to engage in settlement discussion,
mediation, mini-trials, summary jury trials, and the like." Id.
99. An example of the tremendous effect nonbinding arbitration may have on disputing
parties is detailed in Eric D. Green, Recent Developments in Alternative Forms of Dispute
Resolution, 100 F.R.D. 513 (1983). After three years of expensive discovery and litigation,
corporate executives from Telecredit and TRW held a nonbinding arbitration procedure
before the district judge, and subsequently settled in thirty minutes. Id. at 514-16; see also
Mark A. Dombroff, Judicial Resolutions No: Always the Most Desirable, LEGAL THMES, Feb.
28, 1983 at 15 (discussing the success resulting from the use of nonbinding arbitration in a
mass disaster case, where the procedures were both efficient and effective, ultimately
encouraging many of the parties to settle).
100. American Law Institute Study on Paths to a "Better Way" Litigation,
Alternatives, and Accomnodation: Steering Committee Report, 1989 DUKE L. J. 811.
101. rd. at 817 n.10 (citing Gerald Sobel, Abbreviating Complex Civil Cases, in CPR
LEGAL PROGRAM, ADR AND THE COURTS: A MANUAL FOR JUDGES AND LAWYERS 193,
195-96 (1987)).
102. See, e.g., Sid Stahl, Businesses Turn to Mediation, TEx. LAw., March 23, 1992,
at 12. The author suggests that big corporations use third-party advisement techniques such
as nonbinding arbitration because the power of ultimate decision-making shifts to the parties
themselves. "The litigants themselves control their own destiny... a feature every C.E.O.
covets. This 'empowerment' process of allowing the parties to decide for themselves how
their disputes should be resolved is especially appealing to business persons. Most successful
business men and women are good decision-makers who want to control their circumstances.
At the very least, many abhor the thought of delegating their destiny, or their company's, to
a jury." Id.; see also Ellen J. Pollock, Arbitrator Finds Role Dwindling as Rivals Grow,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 28, 1993, at BI.
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State Bar Association, and endorsed by Governor Voinovich and Supreme
Court Chief Justice Moyer, encourages Ohio businesses to avoid litigation
through alternative dispute resolution techniques.' The program
recognizes that most business disputes arise in situations in which neither
side is completely at fault, and thus encourages "a willingness to explore
alternatives to legal warfare ... ."1" However, the program also
acknowledges that not all disputes can be decided outside of litigation, and
thus provides an opt-out provision: "Either party may proceed with
litigation if it believes that the dispute is not suitable for ADR techniques
or if such techniques do not produce satisfactory results." o Clearly,
non-binding alternative dispute resolution techniques are not foreign to the
public policy of Ohio.
V. CONCLUSION
As discussed in this Note, nonbinding arbitration is obviously not,
as the Schaefer plurality contends, an oxymoronic creation of bad drafting,
but rather is a much implemented and highly effective method of
alternative dispute resolution. This is clearly evidenced by the widespread
use and support this particular method of alternative dispute resolution
enjoys within the legal and business communities. The policy dictated in
Schaefer's plurality goes not only against the established public policy of
Ohio, but also against the established trends within the field of alternative
dispute resolution. In the future, perhaps the Ohio Supreme Court should
focus on the positive aspects of nonbinding alternative dispute resolution
methods, rather than severely limiting the usefulness of various dispute
resolution techniques with failed attempts to define basic terms.
The legal questions arising from the arbitration agreement in
Schaefer are difficult indeed. As witnessed by the varying results of the
several cases dealing with similar arbitration provisions, these issues have
never been addressed in a comprehensive manner. The Ohio Supreme
Court was poised to take the forefront in this area by dictating a coherent
analysis of such arbitration provisions. Instead, it not only failed to
takeadvantage of this opportunity, but it also succeeded in dismantling
Ohio's pre-existing public policy supporting the very existence and use of
103. Stephen D. Brandt & Donald A. Rowe, 7he Ohio Corporate Pledge Program,
OHIO LAW., Sep.-Oct. 1992, at I8a (special insert); see also A'Avella, supra note 94, at 6.
104. Brandt & Rowe, supra note 103, at 18a (special insert).
105. Id. (emphasis added).
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nonbinding arbitration. Rather than moving forward, the public policy of
Ohio has now taken a daunting step backward.
John P. Maxwell

